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While information systems provide modern society with great convenience, it also poses 
new problems in maintaining social order. One of its negative influences is the anonymity 
of cyberspace, which makes identity tracing a noteworthy predicament which poses 
obstacles in detection and investigations. It has been found that cyber anonymity has 
critical impacts on criminal motivation, and the phenomena of victimization, and should 
be tackled on different layers including technology and law enforcement. The article 
explores how the anonymity symbolizes the cyberspace, what threats are posed by cyber 
anonymity against social order, what potentialities the anonymity has, how the trans-
territorial anonymity was facilitated, and the real impact of anonymity on law and order 
in the information society. 





The pervasion of information systems facilitates efficient access to information. While 
privacy is at high risk, anonymity, invisibility, and concealment of criminal traces 
become issues of broad concerns. The anonymity of cyberspace makes identity tracing a 
noteworthy predicament which poses obstacles in detection and investigations. This 
article deals with the formation and problem of anonymity in cyberspace in general, and 




anonymity of cybercriminals in particular. It has been found that cyber anonymity has 
critical impacts on criminal motivation, and the phenomena of victimization, and should 
be tackled on different layers including technology and law enforcement. 
 
Following this section, the article will explore how the anonymity symbolizes the 
cyberspace, what threats are posed by cyber anonymity against social order, how the 
anonymity protects cybercriminals, how the trans-territorial anonymity was facilitated, 
and the real impact of anonymity on law and order in the information society. 
 
 
WRESTLING BETWEEN CYBER ANONYMITY AND LAW AND ORDER 
 
Information systems have been increasingly critical in facilitating efficient access to 
information. Today, approximately 3 billion users, or 42% of the world population 
(Internet World Stats 2014) entered a new space networked by instant transfer of 
information. With much more information being accumulated, consumption of 
information becomes a double-edged process. While there is superfluous spam 
information, privacy is at high risk. Although people have appreciated the value and 
significance of cyber anonymity, negative concerns also emerge in anonymity, 
invisibility, and concealment of criminal traces. Cybercrime differs from traditional 
crimes in many different ways, including its universality and complexities, in particular, 
its anonymity, concealment, and invisibilities. The anonymity of cyberspace makes 
identity tracing a noteworthy predicament which poses obstacles in detection and 
investigations. 
For example, in the case of spam, the e-mail can be both the instrument and the objective 
that are used in commercial, political, malicious, or illegal schemes. As a marketing and 
communications means, e-mail has been gradually abused. Unsolicited commercial mails 
(UCE) are typically sent anonymously or with a fabricated identity, and the recipients 
cannot discontinue successive messages. Messages of this kind furthermore consist of 
false or misleading headers, deceiving recipients to retrieve messages that they do not 
desire. Moreover, the recipients have no technique of expressing their inclination not to 




receive such messages, and have no approach of requesting compensation even if they 
undergo loss. The abuse of e-mail has turned into a public annoyance in the online 
background. Even if the application of anti-spam services and technologies is escalating, 
the degree of spam is continuing to boost as swift (OECD 2004, pp. 2-3; OECD 2005, p. 
6), becoming a predicament not only for individual e-mail accounts, but also for business 
accounts. 
Another example is cyber terrorism. Despite the fact that cyber terrorism has not 
developed into a reality as lots of people worried at the end of 20
th
 century, it becomes a 
gorgeous preference for modern-day terrorists for a number of reasons (Weimann 2004, 
p. 6). It is cheaper, more anonymous, aiming at a more massive target and number of 
targets, distantly conducted, and affecting a larger number of people globally. 
International society has barely implemented any countermeasures against conventional 
terrorism in the last few years. Weimann claimed that terrorism in cyberspace was more 
anonymous than conventional terrorist schemes. The fact that terrorists could exploit 
“screen names” or log on as a “guest user” makes it very difficult for security agencies 
and police forces to track down their real identity. What made it worse were that in 
cyberspace there were no physical barriers such as checkpoints to navigate, no borders to 
cross, and no customs agents to outsmart (ibid., p. 6), making terrorists specially 
unidentified. 
Maybe the most real threats and the most serious worries come from offences such as 
harassment and murder. In offences where information systems are used as means of 
committing verbal assault, threat, harassment, alarming, spam and fraud, the motivation 
of the perpetrator is to harass and to kill the victim. The function of the Internet as a 
means of communications and with a high anonymity of interaction often entraps the 
victims into unforeseeable dangers. In 2005, China Ministry of Public Security 
investigated 1,000 assassination cases, in many of which the criminals found the 
potential victims through the Internet (Yi 2006). In many criminal cases, stalkers and 
murderers find, follow, entice, and intimidate victims through the communication and 
interaction of various Internet services, usually anonymously. 
On the other hand, concerning the legal status of cyber anonymity, people have long 
been disputing in vain. Conventional countermeasures and theories about crime 




prevention were based on its material influence and on the material environment, 
although non-material factors have long existed, too. Activities in information systems 
can be expressed in a physically invisible form. What are physically visible in 
information systems are those physical existences, such as hosts and terminals, 
displayers, keyboards, mouse, and cables, while the mechanisms by which the computers 
function are invisible. Cyberspace is developed from information systems as an abstract 
space, differing from the material devices of information systems that include terminals 
and cables. It is invisible and intangible if compared with traditional space (Khosrow-
Pour 1998, p. 440; Robertson 2000, p. 248; Dodge and Kitchin 2001, p. 81). When a web 
page is surfed, what can be seen is only the display of information on the screen. The 
web site is not physically a reading room where people can read magazines, newspapers 
and books, listen to audio records or watch videos, nor a marketplace, bank, street, or 
forum. It is merely a collection of web pages written in various mark-up languages, 
comprised of letters, numbers, and symbols in common use, but which facilitate the 
functions of linkage to other media, communicating with other people or directing to 
other services. The electronic address is not necessarily located along a street, in a 
building or even in a city, province, or country. In addition, the online services are 
usually provided in the manner of a remote transaction paid by means of digital cash or 
virtual money. Finally, the Internet users include individuals and institutions, but they do 
not necessarily appear in person or in an entity in a traditional library, forum, 
marketplace, bank, or along a street. It is entirely an invisible community in an invisible 
space—a group of anonymous netizens interact behind curtains or masks. 
The invisibility of cyberspace worsens the situation caused by cyber anonymity, in the 
sense that criminals and offences in cyberspace become more concealed, while criminal 
justice faces greater difficulties. 
 
ANONYMITY SYMBOLIZES CYBERSPACE 
 
The disappearance of physicality in activities on the Internet symbolizes the new way for 
daily routines, and presents a chance for new practice and changes in faiths, positions, 
and manners (Zigrus 2001, p. 171). To a certain extent, Internet services are provided for 




every user who owns a computer and a modem or cable linked to the server. The real 
identity of the user is not necessary for using the Internet. That is to say, a high degree of 
anonymity is achievable. Anonymity could indicate an intention to lie or not, to do 
something deceit or not. In the environment of online communications, particularly 
during interaction between remote strangers, information systems provide the possibility 
of maintaining anonymity, and we found that the users of information systems have the 
willingness to stay passively anonymous, not necessarily actively lying to their 
counterparts. 
In the case of e-mail, it is uncomplicated to register an e-mail account with false 
information, or to send messages in the name of a certain person. These e-mails may not 
only infringe the legal rights and interests of the person of the counterfeited identity, but 
also are able to fabricate a rumour, slander other people, harm other people’s reputation, 
or practise unfair competition to reduce the competitor’s trustworthiness. No obligation 
of free e-mail service providers has been established to investigate the registrants’ 
identity information. In addition, some web sites also provide anonymous e-mail services 
or sell anonymous e-mail software (Examples of such services and software can be 
searched out with search engines). Under such circumstances, the traceback of the real 
sender is impossible. Only where the providers’ status is clear, under vicarious liability, 
can it be useful for law enforcement in some jurisdictions to hold the re-publisher 
responsible for the content of the original author (Edwards and Walde, eds. 1997, Part 4). 
E-mail has frequently been abused in an anonymous manner so as to realize a fraudulent 
scheme. This anonymity not only facilitates a lie, but may also support a fraud. In R. v. 
Mastronardi (2006 BCSC 1681), the accused, met the plaintiffs through an Internet 
dating service, during which the accused misrepresented himself as a single person and 
engaged in relationship with several victims. He represented himself as: 
“(a) coming from a large, powerful and wealthy Sicilian family; 
(b) being a widower seeking a wife; 
(c) being a medical doctor with a specialty in gynaecology; 
(d) having hospital privileges and a clinic; 
(e) being a kind, caring and considerate person with positive family and moral 
beliefs, conveyed in conversations that went on for hours on end; 




(f) having elaborate and sometimes bizarre family and cultural traditions requiring 
highly submissive wives and amalgamation of finances to an account controlled by him; 
(g) as time went on, being third in command in mafia like family organization; 
(h) not wanting to date, but wanting to immediately enter into an intimate 
relationship, after which his culture and family regarded them as married; 
(i) once so married, his family required him to follow family and cultural 
traditions.” (paragraph 4) 
 
In R. v. Farkas, the accused engaged in online fraud by using different e-mail addresses, 
mailing addresses, and user names, victimizing sellers and purchasers distributed in the 
U. S., Canada, and England (2006 ONCJ 121, 10 April 2006). In R. v. Reynolds & Ors, 
the accused engaged in online chat claiming himself to be a 16-year-old boy, attempting 
to make young girls expose their bodies and transmit photographs to him over the 
Internet ([2007] EWCA Crim 538 (08 March 2007)). 
There are many ways by which people make efforts to detect lies, usually including 
various clues to emotion that may disclose the situation of lying (Ekman 1992, as cited 
in Howitt 2002, pp. 251-253). However, in the electronic lie, none of the clues can be 
useful, particularly those emotional ones, because there is no face-to-face interaction. 
Rather, the interaction itself is covered by a human-machine-human fig leaf. 
Another field where people usually maintain anonymity is interaction in chat rooms. 
Accounting for a considerable fraction of the income of the commercial online providers, 
chat systems support synchronous communication, discussion on different topics, trans-
territorial relationships on common interests, and ignorance of social status (Internet 
Crime Forum IRC subgroup 2001, pp. 7-9; Rowland 1998; Wilbur 1997, p. 5.). The 
biggest advantage of the interaction in chat rooms is that the user can keep anonymous at 
the beginning of the chat or remain anonymous during the whole process. Keeping 
anonymous means that people are able to fabricate identities that cannot be used to 
identify them. By disguising themselves, users can perpetrate fraud and many other 
related activities. This approach is definitely useful, too, in detection and investigation of 
crimes, where law enforcement uses falsified identity to allure and arrest suspects. For 
example, in United States v. Helder, (Eighth Circuit, No. 05-3387, 16 March 2006), an 




undercover officer used a screen name and claimed to be a 14-year-old girl to entrap the 
perpetrator (pp. 2-4); in United States v. Baker (Seventh Circuit, No. 05-2499, 24 
January 2006), an undercover officer used a screen name and claimed to be a 14-year-old 
boy to entrap the perpetrator (pp. 2-3); in United States v. Antelope (Ninth Circuit No. 
03-30557, 8 June, 2004. Docket num. 03-30334, January 2005), the accused joined an 
Internet site advertising "Preteen Nude Sex Pics" and started corresponding with an 
undercover law-enforcement agent, in respect of whom the accused was entrapped when 
he ordered a child pornography video over the Internet; in United States v. McGraw 
(Tenth Circuit No. 02-1407, D. C. No. 01-CR-426-B, 2 December 2003), the accused 
was also caught by an undercover agent, with whom he expressed his interests in 
“having sexual contact with ‘white males between the ages of 12 and 15’,” and arranged 
a encounter (See also R. v. Randall, Provincial Court of Nova Scotia 2006 NSPC 19, No. 
1538177, 28 April 2006). The actual reality is that, in information systems, determining 
users’ identity proves difficult, but not impossible. 
 
 
POTENTIALITY OF ANONYMITY 
 
Communicating anonymously is a great characteristic of the Internet environment. In 
using the Internet, anonymity can be kept from the beginning to the end. First, 
anonymous access to the Internet poses the most serious threat. In many countries, one of 
the most important forms of using the Internet is realized through cyber cafés or libraries, 
where anonymous users can access many of the online services. Definitely, there exist 
different situations in different countries. Compared with Finland where there are few 
cyber cafés in towns and cities, the cyber cafés in China have become the “third space” 
of school-aged juveniles besides home and school. The facilities and services in 
academic or public libraries are far less convenient for users than those in cyber cafés 
managed by private firms. An increasing number of hacking cases involving the Internet 
or Internet users are committed or conspired in cyber cafés. 
Secondly, anonymous subscription to the Internet services raises the difficulty of 
identifying users. The personal information provided for the registration of an e-mail 




account, the name and address of e-mail messages, and the authors’ information in 
Usenet, etc., can all be fabricated. Keeping identity anonymous is favourable for the 
protection of users from victimization, but it also favours the hiding of perpetrators from 
being traced. 
Thirdly, users can keep their identity anonymous in the process of online 
communications. There are also mechanisms for keeping complete anonymity by which 
one user can send messages to other users, and then the messages are transmitted to the 
final target, such as newsgroup, e-mail list, or a single e-mail account. What makes it 
more complex is that in the mechanisms the intermediary can only be a programme and 
may be in another jurisdiction (Kingdon 1994). This also reminds us that there exists the 
possibility of numerous transmitting points, by which messages are transmitted from one 
terminal to the next terminal, from that to the next in line, and so on, until the message 
reached the destination. 
Tracing this transmitting process is theoretically possible. During the tracing process, the 
investigation is exactly the contrary to the process of transmission. Each time, the 
investigator can trace back one point. 
It is likely that all points are identifiable. Nevertheless, as long as there is an unexpected 
element at any point, the tracing chain can be disrupted without reaching the original 
source. According to National Police Agency of Japan (1998), the possible examples 
include that the victim has no record of the Internet Protocol (IP) address; ISPs do not 
keep suitable records; hackers alter the logs; or some points are located in countries that 
have not criminalized hacking. As Koch (Inter@ctive Week, 10 July 2000) has pointed 
out, theories about detection remain theories, and they are too new to be tested in 
practice. Even if all the work of traceback is fulfilled, the actual value of this work may 
be discounted in a judicial process because of different locations and thus diversified 
jurisdictions. 
Fourthly, the specific service or software can play further roles in hiding users. 
Cybercriminals usually establish anonymizers, which are systems particularly designed 
to invalidate technical identification of the source of communications (See Belgium’s 
answer to the “Questionnaire 5: Have you received any reports from your law-
enforcement authorities that have indicated an obstruction of their work due to the non-




existence of appropriate legal instruments concerning traffic data retention?” in Council 
of the European Union, Council doc. 11490/1/02 CRIMORG 67 TELECOM 4 REV 1, 
Brussels, 20 November 2002). In fact, this kind of service or software can also be 
conveniently obtained free of charge or at an inexpensive price from the Internet. 
Everyone who is online can get access to these tools and services. Such software is likely 
to be replicated and spread unlimitedly, creating a bigger population of hidden users who 
potentially threaten the security of information systems. 
Although the anonymity of cybercriminals poses a series of questions, it is still the core 
of the “perfect environment” for the criminals. Levinson (2002, p. 455) said that 
anonymity is exploited by perpetrators of old crimes such as fraud, pornography, 
gambling, stalking and identity theft, or new crimes such as unauthorized access, denial 
of service, and malicious programmes. Yet it is at the same time welcomed by Internet 
users. People are constantly concerned that without online anonymity, it could be 
impossible to guarantee fundamental rights (COM(2000) 890 final, p. 20; National 
Police Agency of Japan 1998). It is not strange that the European Union Data Protection 
Working Party’s Recommendation recognized that online anonymity brings about a 
dilemma for governments and international organizations (The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party 2001): in particular, in maintaining human rights to privacy 
and freedom of expression, and combating cybercrimes (COM(2000) 890 final, p. 20). 
Philip (2002) warned that anonymity can provide users with “the courage to do the 
outrageous and sometimes even resort to illegal activities.” 
Mitchell and Banker (1997, pp. 707-711) have concluded that there are four 
characteristics in which cybercrimes are different from traditional crimes, that is to say, 
difficulties in detection, limited reporting, jurisdictional complexities, and resource 
constraint. All these four aspects fall under the broad characteristic of concealment. The 
concealment of cybercrimes has been brought about by other technological and human 
factors (Conly 1991; Clark 1996; Stephenson 2000; Mandia and Prosises 2003; Mohay 
and co-workers 2003; Vacca 2005; Johnson 2006). 
Most of traditional offences are greatly observable due to apparent depredations, 
presence of witnesses, and so on. There are also traditional crimes that occur in private 
places and become less visible (Walsh 1983, p. 236). Unlike traditional threats where 




criminals are physically present at the crime scene, cybercriminals are usually not 
present at the crime scene thus making apprehension difficult (Speer 2000, p. 260). In 
information systems, executing a command to delete files does not mean that the files are 
permanently deleted. What happens is merely that files are hidden due to a change in file 
names so that the files can be recovered. In United States v. Angevine (Tenth Circuit No. 
01-6097, D. C. No. 00-CR-106-M, 22 February 2002), ”the computer expert used special 
technology to retrieve the data that had remained latent in the computer’s memory,” 
though the accused had attempted to delete the relevant files. In United States v. Upham 
(First Circuit No. 98-1121, 12 February 1999), the investigator used the “undelete” 
function of a programme to recover deleted files from the deposit media, as primary 
evidence in conviction. In Robertson v. Her Majesty's Advocate ([2004] ScotHC 11 (17 
February 2004)), the police recovered 347 deleted images from the unallocated space, 
and 878 images and 45 movies from deleted zip file within the disc. Only when a secure-
eraser programme is in use, the files are permanently deleted. For example, in the case of 
International Airport Centres, L. L. C., et al v. Jacob Citrin (Seventh Circuit No. 05-
1522, 24 October 2005) (p. 2). Skilful criminals can disable this kind of security 
mechanism, and conceal the data that might possible be taken as evidence in prosecution. 
Technological advances have both a positive impact on businesses and a negative impact 
on law enforcement (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). For example, in 
the DrinkOrDie case, the online software piracy group concealed its actions by various 
security measures: exchanging e-mails via private mail server using encryption; using a 
nickname to identify members, and communicating about group business only in closed, 
invite-only IRC channels; the FTP sites, where tens of thousands of pirated software, 
game, movie, and music titles were deposited, were secured by particular authentication 
mechanisms (U. S. Department of Justice, Press release, 17 May 2002). On the other 
hand, the available technological solutions have not completely met the requirement of 
data collection, log analysis, and Internet protocol tracing (American Society for 
Industrial Security 2004, p. 40). There is also the necessity for law-enforcement agencies 
to recruit personnel with “electrical engineering and computer-science backgrounds” 
(Fields 2004, p. B1); 
Inevitably, critics point out that cyber police have extra incentives than combating 




cybercrime, for example, asking for more money, more wiretap, bugs in computers and 
sell phones, weak encryption and permission to implement security technology, without 
more arrest following (Koch Inter@ctive Week, 10 July 2000). 
Concealment of crimes has important economic effects. Stanley (1995, p. 2) stated that 
concealment of crime can decrease the incentives not to perpetrate, and increase the costs 
of law enforcement. Concealment of cybercrime demonstrates the low probability of 
punishment. In the U. S., only one in 100 cases was detected, one in 8 prosecuted, while 
only one in 33 prosecuted cybercrimes resulted in a prison sentence. That is to say, the 
likelihood that a cybercriminal would be put into prison was a one in 26,400 chance 
(Daler and co-workers 1989, p. 22), as compared with the likelihood of imprisonment in 
traditional bank robbery a one in three chance (ibid.). Law-enforcement agencies found 
that a majority of cybercrimes never reached the criminal-justice system. Even in the 
relatively few cases where a crime was reported, most often the criminal's identity was 
never discovered. As a consequence, as Radzinowicz and King (1977, p. 67) pointed out, 
“The calculation of chance is as applicable to the commission of crime as to many other 
activities.” Given other factors constant, if cybercrime is more concealed than other 
offences, the potential perpetrators are more motivated to take illegal actions on the 





Free flow of information from one state to another is a purpose of information systems 
(Directive 95/46/EC, Preamble (3); UN A/RES/51/162; Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Article 12), but trans-border flow is not free (The Convention mentioned above, Article 
12 provides the limit on trans-border transfer of data). The trans-border information flux 
is accompanied by risks of crime of a similar nature. In any country, the court must have 
jurisdiction over the person or the subject-matter of a lawsuit. This works well with the 
current set-up of law-enforcement agencies that are territorial and are operating in 
different villages, towns, districts, cities, counties, states or provinces, or national 




boundaries. Nevertheless, unauthorized access to information systems can be 
accomplished from virtually anywhere on the networks (See cases such as United States 
v. Tenebaum (Israel), 18 March, 1998, involving an Israeli hacking United States 
military computers; United States v. Gorshkov (W.D. Wash) 4 October 2002, Russian 
hacker; United States v. McKinnon I (E.D. Va.) and II (D. N.J.) 12 November 2002, 
British National Hacked into the U. S. Military Networks; United States v. Zezev (S.D. 
N.Y.) 1 July 2003, Hackers from Kazakhstan; United States v. Ivanov (D. Conn.) 25 July 
2003, Russian hacker), because the communications capability of cyberspace allows 
criminals to conspire more easily, without geographical proximity to one another or to 
the target (Lenk 1997, pp. 126-135). The international characteristic of cybercrime is 
evident (National Police Agency 1998). In fact, some of the cases prosecuted have been 
of this nature, for instance, R. v. Kozun (2007 MBPC 7), where the forensic analysis of 
the computer of the accused disclosed that 165 separate users from 15 countries had 
traded through his computer. The computer was converted into an automated trading 
centre through a programme, by which 141 users had traded in the previous 13 days. 
The sphere of legal jurisdiction makes the cybercrime enforcement more complicated 
(Lee and co-workers 1999, p. 873). Smith, Grabosky, and Urbas (2004) concluded that 
the trans-national dimension of cybercrime posed four formidable challenges for 
prosecutors, who have to determine whether the conduct in question is criminal in their 
own jurisdiction, collect sufficient evidence to mobilize the law, identify the perpetrator, 
and determine his or her location, and decide whether to leave the matter to the local 
authorities or to extradite the offender (pp. 48-49). 
Sinrod and Reilly (2000, p. 2) have pointed out that although some international 
organizations are examining cooperative mechanisms in the field of fighting against 
cybercrime, many of their members are slow in recognizing the urgency of the situation. 
The elimination of borders favours inter-jurisdictional mobility of crime. Due to the 
actual difficulty in establishing jurisdiction, even if a certain offence is detected, it is still 
uncertain whether the way can easily lead to punishment. In R. v. Burns ([2003] NICC 
13(2) (12 September 2003)), where the accused cloned mobile phones, or exploited 
faults or loopholes in the internal phone systems of companies or organizations to make 
cheap or free calls at the expense of those companies or organizations, the court found 





“As the investigation progressed it became more wide-ranging and involved another 
suspect and its ramifications were such that it eventually spread to other parts of the 
United Kingdom, to Tokyo, to South America, as well as to New Jersey and Atlanta in 
the United States of America. Several large organizations in the United Kingdom, other 
police forces and international telephone companies were involved. When it became 
apparent to the police that they did not have either the specialist equipment or the 
necessary expertise to access much of the information, specialist firms had to be engaged. 
All of this took a great deal of time.” Reasonably, suggestions have been made to 
incorporate cyberspace into various jurisdictional frameworks. Nonetheless, this needs a 
great deal of time, agreement, and co-operation between countries, which are still 
struggling to take common actions. 
Finally, it is worth noting that trans-national cases just make up a inconsequential part of 
cybercrime. No convinced conclusion can be drawn because it is probable that trans-
national offences are not as prevalent as scholars have assumed. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to reveal these offences for reasons that scholars have laid bare. Or, it may be, 
that it is simply law enforcement does not put sufficient emphasis on these offences. 
Before credible data are available to give an answer to this question, we have certain 
reasons to claim that trans-national offences have sometimes of a dual nature: they do not 
appear as prevalent as domestic offences, but they are more difficult to detect and convict. 
In addition, because the investigation of trans-national offences is more expensive and 
time-consuming, law enforcement will not give more priorities to these offences than to 
cases that have happened “close to home”. 
Because information systems alone are no longer subject to the physical limit of 
traditional countries, we can expect that many offences traditionally committed in 
neighborhoods, communities, and native areas now extend beyond national boundaries. 
Many other offences traditionally committed in a trans-border manner are becoming a 
means to acquire new markets in the more networked globe. Some new offences can, 
indeed, only be completed in a trans-national style. Trans-national crime can be seen as 
the counterpart of international trade in civil society, being an involuntary transaction 




between perpetrators and the social order (in many cases, involving victims, but in many 
other cases, victimless). 
For example, in McKinnon v USA & Anor ([2007] EWHC 762 (Admin) (03 April 
2007)), the accused used his own computer in London and obtained unauthorized access 
to dozens of governmental computers of the U. S., from which he discovered the 
identities of certain administrative accounts and associated passwords. He installed 
remote control software on these administrative computers. The software enabled him to 
access and change data at any time. 
Many people have taken it for granted that because computer networks are trans-
national, naturally most crimes committed in relation to the networks are also trans-
national. This poses a great concern among academia, law-enforcement agency, and 
legislature. However, this is still an unanswered question: firstly, information systems 
have crossed the national boundaries, but prosecuted offences are mostly confined within 
these boundaries; secondly, due to lack of an international arrangement of law and 
enforcement, few trans-national cybercrime offenders have been investigated; and 
thirdly, offences are mostly territory-dependent, and do not cross the border at all. 
All these factors are responsible for the low likelihood of trans-national cybercrime, but, 
as we have seen and will see further, the absence of international legal harmonization 
and assistance mechanisms contributes primarily to the current invisibility of trans-
national cybercrime. 
 
IMPACT OF CYBER ANONYMITY ON CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND 
VICTIMIZATION 
 
Lack of punishment reduced the expected cost of the criminals, which were composed 
thus of moral costs and substantial costs, specifically, the perpetrators’ necessary devices 
and labour in cybercrime. Because there was no cybercrime law, there was neither 
expected punishment nor the expected cost induced by the expected punishment. Under 
such circumstances, the probability of conviction equalled zero. The expected utility of 
the perpetrator almost equalled the utility of a situation in which crime went undetected 
or unpunished. According to an economic analysis of crime (Becker 1968, pp. 169-217), 




those who are risk-indifferent are indifferent to detection and conviction. For those who 
are risk-lovers, cybercrime becomes a new cause, a new chance, a new challenge, and a 
new type of risk. For those who are risk avoiders, because of the low risk of detection 
and conviction rate of cybercrime, they transfer from other offences to cybercrime. 
Therefore, the number of cybercrimes and perpetrators will inevitably increase.  
The low cost of cybercrime and the difficulty in detection and evidence collection create 
incentives for potential perpetrators. The nature of high intelligence, trans-territoriality, 
and high concealment of cyber transgress and cybercrime make it difficult to detect and 
investigate the cases (See Conly 1991; Clark 1996; Stephenson 2000; Mandia and 
Prosises 2003; Mohay and co-workers 2003; Vacca 2005; Johnson 2006). Stating from 
another standpoint, cybercrime surpasses the current capacity of public and private 
regulators to control (Grabosky 2000, p. 2). As for the transgressors or criminals, they 
usually only need to click the mouse or knock the keyboard at home or in the office in 
order to commit the illegality in a short time. The risks and costs are in cybercrime lower 
than those in traditional crime, while the benefits are higher. This cost-effectiveness 
further strengthens the mind of the perpetrator to commit cybercrime. 
Cybercriminals have a greater advantage than most of the traditional criminals in respect 
of the low probability of arrest and conviction. Hatcher and co-workers (1997, pp. 397, 
399.) have pointed out that many cybercrimes are not reported. The term “dark figure”, 
used by criminologists to refer to unreported or unrecorded crime, has been applied to 
denote undiscovered cybercrimes (UNCJIN 1999, Paragraph 30). As Radzinowicz and 
King (1977) pointed out that, “The recorded figures of crime are huge but the reality 
behind them everywhere looms far larger. The sinister word dunkelziffer (dark figure) 
was coined at the turn of the century to express this hidden reality.” (p. 42). Many 
intrusions are not detected for a variety of reasons (COM (2000) 890 final, p. 11). 
Cybercrimes can well be described as hidden crimes, which is used by Cook (1997) to 
denote under-reported or under-recorded crimes such as domestic violence, sexual 
assault, and racial harassment (p. 55-58), the counterpart of which is “hidden victims,” 
denoting the victims of the “hidden crimes” (p. 127). 
At the same time, victims of cybercrime are keen to be hidden victims (Cook 1997, p. 
127). The usual “motives for silence” pertaining to victimization may fall into one of the 




following categories: 1. The idea that the victimization is not worth the mobilization of 
justice; 2. Involvement; 3. Pressures of fear; 4. The perturbed accessibility of police and 
court; and 5. The ignorance of events by the police (Radzinowicz and King 1977, pp. 38-
40). 
In sketching the victim decision-making, Greenberg and Ruback (1985) have established 
a three-stage model: the victim judges whether the event is a crime, evaluates its 
seriousness and decides what to do (Greenberg and Ruback 1985, as cited by Feldman 
1993, p. 26). Before these stages, one stage that is more essential should be included, that 
is, whether the victim knows the event. If this is the case, the reporting of cybercrime 
might stay at a lower level, because cybercrime is imperceptible and thorny to notice; it 
is much trickier for the victim to judge whether the event is a crime and to estimate the 
losses; and the victim has less awareness of whether there is an agency to report the 
crime. The limited reporting of the cybercrime has been noted more than 20 years ago by 
Parker and Nycum (1984, p. 313), who studied the invisibility of computer crime. At 
present, the Internet’s virtual environment has made the circumstances still poorer. 
Auspicious progress in proving material evidences in traditional crimes was made in late 
1980s when DNA tests were first introduced (Levinson 2002, p. 537). Nonetheless, 
digital evidence in computer crime is untouched by such high-technological testing 
measures. The invisibility of cybercrimes is based on numerous factors, either technical 
or artificial (UNCJIN 1999, Paragraphs 30, 31). Sometimes, the straightforward cause is 
that the victims are not enthusiastic to report, or even do not know where to report the 
case (Salgado 2001). The acknowledged reasons for the reluctance to launch legal 
actions are principally fear of undesirable publicity, public humiliation or loss of 
goodwill, loss of investor or public confidence, resulting economic consequences such as 
the panic effect that this information would create on their stock prices (See Carter 1995, 
p. 21; Roush 1995, pp. 32, 34; Gelbstein and Kamal 2002, p. 2; McKenna 2003), and 
exposure to future attacks (COM (2000) 890 final, p. 11). The UN suggested that these 
factors have a momentous impact on the detection of cybercrime (UNCJIN 1999, 
Paragraph 31). 
Yet there are other reasons for the victim to remain silence. While many people are 
vigorous in maintaining their interests and rights, some people view victimization as 




their own malfunction in life and profession and are not enthusiastic to expose the reality 
of their failure to any individuals and institutions, so as not to make public their own 
disadvantage. 
Therefore, it is unavoidable that the rate of unidentified instances of cybercrimes has 
increased as a consequence. The 2013 Australian Cyber Crime and Security Survey 
Report summarized the reasons why respondents did not report cyber security incidents, 
44% of them said “there are no benefits of reporting”; 44% chose “other”, meaning that 
the incidents and the consequences were minor, and that the incidents were reported 
internally and managed by corporate policy; 20% said that “the attackers probably 
wouldn’t get caught &/or prosecuted”;  16% of them “did not know”; and 12% worried 
about “negative publicity for the organisation” (CERT Australia 2014, p. 35). This and 
other similar surveys has indicated the percentages of respondents identifying each stated 
rationale as being very imperative in their assessment not to report computer intrusion. 





Without ignoring all its merits, cyber anonymity has deep impact on occurrence of 
cybercrime, mostly reducing the potential likelihood of detection and thus its costs. In 
fact, anonymity may to some extent encourage potential perpetrators to take the risk. On 
the other hand, victims may lose opportunities to make judgment on whether or not it is 
of their interest to interact with hidden perpetrators. Once crime occurs, anonymity 
further hinders law enforcement from detecting and investigating. 
In recent year, wrestling between claims for and against cyber anonymity has been 
continuing. However, there has some new advancement in judicial sector. The European 
Union Court of Justice issued a decision on May 13 2014, in case C-131/12 (Google 
Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez), ruling that the “right to be forgotten” is embedded in the provisions of 
Directive 95/46/EEC (Iglezakis 2014, p. 4).  The right to be forgotten is a special field of 
cyber anonymity. If cyber anonymity is not imposed any limit, vulnerable users and 




incompetent law enforcement cannot cope with problems accompanying it. Therefore, 
the right to be forgotten applies only where the information is “inaccurate, inadequate, 
irrelevant or excessive for the purposes of the data processing” (para 93 of the ruling). 
the Court unambiguously spelt out that the right to be forgotten is not unconditional but 
will always have to be “balanced against other fundamental rights”, for instance the 
freedom of expression and of the media (para 85 of the ruling). Absolute freedom of 
anonymity should not be allowed as the case in the real society. There is a necessity to 
balance the needs to protect privacy and prevent cybercrime (Shinder, 2011). 
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